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Abstract	
	
According	to	a	widely	used	theoretical	perspective,	our	everyday	experiences	lead	us	
to	become	natural	experts	at	perceiving	and	recognising	human	faces.	However,	
there	has	been	considerable	debate	about	this	view.	We	discuss	criteria	for	expertise	
and	show	how	the	debate	over	face	expertise	has	often	missed	key	points	
concerning	the	role	and	nature	of	face	familiarity.	For	identity	recognition,	most	of	
us	show	only	limited	expertise	with	unfamiliar	faces.	Carefully	evaluating	the	senses	
in	which	it	is	appropriate	or	inappropriate	to	say	that	we	are	face	experts	leads	to	
the	conclusion	that	we	are,	in	effect,	familiar	face	experts.	
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The	appeal	of	the	idea	of	face	expertise	
	
We	spend	much	of	our	lives	looking	at	faces.	The	idea	that	we	gain	naturally	
acquired	expertise	at	perceiving	and	recognising	the	kind	of	faces	we	encounter	
therefore	has	a	powerful	intuitive	appeal.	In	fact	it	has	become	one	of	the	most	
widely	used	theoretical	perspectives	in	studies	of	face	recognition.	According	to	this	
perspective,	acquired	expertise	makes	us	very	good	at	recognising	faces.	Expertise	
has	also	been	claimed	to	account	for	other-race	effects	(see	Glossary)	in	face	
recognition,	for	the	development	of	holistic	processing,	for	inversion	effects,	and	for	
similarities	and	differences	between	the	recognition	of	faces	and	other	types	of	
visual	stimuli	as	diverse	as	cars,	dogs,	birds,	butterflies,	chess	positions,	and	greebles	
[1-8].		
	
Nonetheless,	there	has	been	a	highly	polarised	debate	about	the	issues	surrounding	
this	interpretation,	with	strong	opinions	expressed	on	both	sides.	Our	aim	here	is	to	
show	how	this	debate	has	often	missed	key	points	concerning	expertise,	and	
especially	the	role	of	face	familiarity.	Although	we	are	usually	good	at	recognising	
familiar	faces,	most	of	us	experience	substantial	problems	with	recognising	the	
identities	of	unfamiliar	faces.	We	will	discuss	different	criteria	for	expertise	and	
outline	recent	experimental	and	computational	studies	that	help	in	understanding	
the	ways	in	which	it	is	appropriate	or	inappropriate	to	say	that	we	are	face	experts.	
Understanding	the	underlying	determinants	of	expertise	and	their	implications	leads	
to	a	different	resolution	of	the	issues	that	offers	a	novel	way	forward.	
	
The	facial	expertise	debate	
	
The	idea	of	naturally	acquired	expertise	in	recognising	faces	is	grounded	in	the	
observation	that	faces	form	a	class	of	visual	stimuli	with	high	inter-item	similarity	
that	require	within-category	recognition	at	a	subordinate	level;	the	superordinate	
category	being	'faces',	and	the	subordinate	categories	the	individual	faces	
themselves.	This	idea	received	support	from	studies	of	acquired	prosopagnosia	
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which	had	shown	that	inability	to	recognise	familiar	faces	was	often	associated	with	
problems	in	recognising	other	highly	similar	visual	stimuli	[9].	Because	faces	will	so	
often	need	to	be	individuated	in	everyday	life,	the	claim	is	that	we	become	expert	at	
doing	this	and	that	this	expertise	explains	such	well-known	properties	of	face	
recognition	as	inversion	effects	and	holistic	processing	[1-2].		
	
This	approach	has	been	extended	by	introducing	the	greebles	class	of	artificial	
stimuli	to	study	perceptual	expertise	created	in	the	laboratory	[3].	Learning	to	
individuate	upright	greebles	can	lead	to	inversion	effects	and	enhanced	holistic	
processing	for	greebles,	and	these	effects	may	involve	changes	in	brain	regions	
typically	considered	to	show	face-specific	responses	[3,	5].	On	this	basis	it	has	been	
claimed	that	what	appear	to	be	face-specific	brain	regions	are	better	considered	as	
regions	dedicated	to	within-category	recognition	that	have	become	'automatized	by	
expertise'	[4-5].	
	
This	interpretation	has	been	disputed	by	others	who	argue	there	are	grounds	for	
postulating	an	evolved	neural	substrate	to	face	recognition	[10-12].	For	example,	
contrary	to	the	hypothesis	that	faces	make	use	of	a	generic	ability	to	distinguish	
items	within	any	visually	homogeneous	category,	some	cases	of	acquired	
prosopagnosia	do	seem	to	involve	a	face-specific	impairment	[13-14].	The	debate	
has	been	passionate	because	so	much	appears	to	be	at	stake.	In	essence,	it	seems	to	
involve	whether	category	selectivity	(e.g.	for	faces)	is	a	fundamental	organising	
principle	of	visual	cortex,	or	simply	a	by-product	of	acquired	expertise.	We	will	show	
that	while	this	debate	has	undoubtedly	sharpened	our	thinking	and	led	to	interesting	
findings,	both	conceptions	miss	key	points.	
	
What	characterises	acquired	expertise?	
	
Surprisingly,	what	it	might	actually	mean	to	say	that	we	are	face	experts	is	seldom	
discussed.	Instead,	the	idea	is	usually	directly	linked	to	an	assumed	operational	
definition	in	which	expertise	is	indexed	through	better	recognition	of	upright	than	
inverted	stimuli	or	through	enhanced	holistic	processing	[1-3].	
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However,	the	idea	of	expertise	clearly	has	a	variety	of	different	connotations.	Most	
obviously,	becoming	expert	requires	extensive	practice	and	perhaps	some	form	of	
careful	study,	but	also	the	consequence	of	this	will	involve	reaching	a	high	level	of	
skilled	performance.	Criteria	for	expertise	could	therefore	include	a	mixture	of	at	
least	three	things.	First,	expert	performance	should	be	based	on	substantial	
experience.	Second,	expert	performance	should	lead	to	accurate	responses.	Third,	as	
for	other	acquired	skills,	expert	performance	should	involve	a	relatively	high	degree	
of	automaticity	[5,	15-17].		
	
Of	course,	there	are	well-known	examples	beyond	the	domain	of	face	perception	
where	the	idea	of	acquired	perceptual	expertise	clearly	does	apply,	both	in	real	
contexts	such	as	radiology	and	for	expertise	acquired	in	the	lab	(greebles).	
Radiologists,	for	example,	have	learnt	through	years	of	practice	and	training	to	
quickly	and	accurately	detect	abnormalities	in	scans	[18].	The	question	at	issue,	
though,	is	whether	these	forms	of	perceptual	learning	are	actually	comparable	to	
face	recognition?	
	
One	obvious	potential	parallel	between	face	recognition	and	these	examples	of	
acquired	expertise	with	stimuli	other	than	faces	lies	in	our	first	criterion	for	
expertise;	the	role	of	experience.	The	importance	of	experience	with	faces	is	evident	
in	many	infant	studies,	including	work	on	perceptual	narrowing	showing	that	infants	
become	less	adept	at	remembering	pictures	of	monkey	faces	as	they	become	more	
experienced	with	human	faces	[19].	Moreover,	the	extent	of	this	perceptual	
narrowing	can	be	reduced	if	non-human	faces	are	more	strongly	present	in	the	
infant's	environment,	which	again	shows	how	the	faces	that	are	seen	can	shape	
perceptual	organisation	[20].	As	adults	we	remain	susceptible	to	effects	of	previous	
experience,	as	shown	for	example	by	other-race	effects	[21-23]	whose	origin	can	
again	be	traced	back	to	experience	in	early	years	[24-27].	Although	it	is	debated	
whether	social	psychological	factors	may	also	contribute	to	other-race	effects	[21,	
28],	there	is	a	clear	contribution	from	perceptual	factors	[21,	29].	Likewise,	the	
constraining	effects	of	previous	experience	are	revealed	in	the	fact	that	it	is	very	
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difficult	for	adults	to	learn	new	faces	from	seldom-encountered	formats,	such	as	
inversion	or	contrast	negation[30].	
	
Substantial,	lifelong	perceptual	experience	is	therefore	undoubtedly	important	to	
face	recognition,	and	in	this	sense	the	first	of	our	criteria	for	face	expertise	does	
seem	applicable.	However,	other	criteria	for	expertise,	including	our	second	criterion	
of	accurate	performance,	are	not	always	met.	Rather	surprisingly,	most	of	us	are	less	
good	at	some	types	of	face	recognition	than	we	may	like	to	think.	In	laboratory	
recognition	memory	tasks	that	involve	trying	to	learn	new	faces,	for	example,	any	
change	between	the	studied	and	test	images	of	a	face	creates	a	notable	decrement	
in	performance	[31-32];	we	seem	to	learn	more	about	the	specific	photographs	than	
the	faces	that	were	studied.	Importantly,	this	is	not	simply	a	memory	problem;	the	
same	difficulties	arise	in	purely	perceptual	matching	tasks	with	unfamiliar	faces,	as	
shown	in	Figure	1	[33-35].	
	
-----	FIGURE	1	ABOUT	HERE,	PLEASE	-----	
	
In	the	face	matching	task	shown	in	Figure	1	(a),	average	error	rates	are	substantial	
(typically	30%	with	unlimited	viewing	time)	even	though	the	images	are	fairly	
standardised	[33];	the	upper	and	lower	images	in	Figure	1	(a)	have	much	the	same	
pose	and	expression	and	they	were	all	taken	on	the	same	day,	but	with	a	different	
camera.		
	
When	a	wider	range	of	image	differences	in	pose,	expression,	lighting	and	the	date	
when	the	photograph	was	taken	is	introduced,	most	people	do	even	worse.	Try	for	
yourself	the	task	shown	in	Figure	1	(b),	which	simply	involves	deciding	how	many	
different	people	are	present	in	the	array	of	40	photos.	When	the	faces	used	are	
unfamiliar	to	participants,	they	arrive	at	solutions	involving	between	3	and	16	
different	identities,	with	nine	identities	being	the	most	common	number	[34].	In	
other	words,	participants	typically	think	there	are	around	nine	different	individuals	
in	the	set	of	40	photos.	However,	there	are	actually	only	two.	Most	people	tend	to	
mistake	differences	between	the	images	for	differences	in	identity,	leading	them	to	
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overestimate	the	number	of	faces	in	the	display.	If	the	faces	are	of	another	race,	the	
level	of	performance	drops	still	further	[22-23].	
	
This	observation	that	most	of	us	can	be	confused	by	the	variability	between	images	
of	the	same	unfamiliar	face	has	been	developed	into	the	widely	used	Glasgow	Face	
Matching	Test,	illustrated	in	Figure	1	(c).	The	test	shows	a	remarkable	range	of	
abilities	across	different	individuals	in	the	population,	ranging	from	near-chance	to	
near-perfect	performance	[35].	Furthermore,	performance	is	highly	stable;	some	
people	are	consistently	better	at	matching	unfamiliar	faces	than	others.		
	
In	sum,	whereas	the	idea	of	generic	naturally	acquired	expertise	for	face	identity	
implies	that	we	should	find	little	difficulty	in	seeing	whether	photographs	show	same	
or	different	individuals,	studies	using	unfamiliar	faces	show	that,	for	most	of	us,	this	
is	far	from	the	case.	
	
Image	variability	is	central	to	understanding	the	phenomena	shown	in	Figure	1.	
Photographs	of	faces	differ	in	many	ways	that	include	pose,	expression,	lighting,	
camera	and	lens	characteristics.	This	variability	can	result	from	within-person	
variability	(differences	between	different	images	of	the	same	face)	or	between-
person	variability	(differences	between	images	of	different	faces).	As	Figure	1	shows,	
within-person	variability	can	be	substantial	and	for	unfamiliar	faces	it	is	easily	
confused	with	between-person	variability.	
	
Importantly,	just	as	the	photographs	in	Figure	1,	real-life	views	of	faces	are	also	
highly	variable;	this	is	true	whether	the	faces	are	seen	in	person,	in	videos,	or	
photographs.		So	potentially	we	should	all	have	abundant	experience	of	the	
consequences	of	image	variability	to	draw	upon.	Despite	this,	our	perception	and	
recognition	of	unfamiliar	face	identity	often	does	not	meet	standards	of	accuracy	
that	could	justify	our	second	criterion	for	the	'expert'	label,	being	instead	prone	to	
error	in	many	circumstances.	Even	with	lifelong	experience,	image	variability	can	
limit	our	ability	to	perceive	identity	in	unfamiliar	faces.	
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The	same	findings	arise	in	highly	realistic	conditions.	For	eye	witness	testimony,	
although	witness	confidence	may	well	be	correlated	with	correct	identification	of	
the	suspect	across	a	sample	of	cases	[36],	it	has	long	been	known	that	individual	
witnesses	can	nonetheless	be	mistaken	even	when	they	are	certain	that	they	are	
correct	[37].	Even	when	no	event	memory	is	required,	such	as	when	matching	
someone's	face	to	a	presented	passport	or	an	identity	card,	most	people	make	many	
errors	[38-40],	as	described	in	Box	1.	
	
-----	BOX	1	ABOUT	HERE,	PLEASE	-----	
	
As	well	as	failing	to	account	for	problems	most	of	us	experience	with	unfamiliar	face	
identity	and	the	surprisingly	high	incidences	of	misrecognition	in	applied	and	
forensic	settings	(Figure	1	and	Box	1),	there	are	other	substantial	limitations	to	the	
applicability	of	the	natural	expertise	hypothesis	to	face	recognition.	It	cannot	readily	
explain	the	large	and	stable	individual	differences	in	unfamiliar	face	recognition	
ability	in	the	population	[35].	Moreover,	recent	studies	have	shown	significant	
heritability	and	genetic	specificity	of	this	ability,	demonstrating	influences	beyond	
the	role	of	naturally	acquired	expertise	[43-46].	
	
In	fact,	attempts	to	train	or	enhance	face	expertise	mostly	end	in	failure	[40,	47-48].	
While	there	are	substantial	inter-individual	differences	in	unfamiliar	face	recognition	
ability,	these	are	little	affected	by	experience.	For	example,	despite	their	training	
and	extensive	practice,	passport	officers	and	others	who	use	face	recognition	
throughout	their	working	lives	show	the	same	variability	in	performance	as	the	rest	
of	the	population	[40].	Only	forms	of	training	involving	unusual	and	task-specific	
strategies	[42]	have	shown	any	benefit	(see	Box	1).	
	
Nonetheless,	despite	these	problems	with	perceiving	individual	face	identity,	there	
are	things	we	can	do	relatively	well	with	unfamiliar	faces.	Inferences	concerning	
social	characteristics	such	as	gender,	race	and	apparent	age	are	reliable	across	
different	perceivers	and	often	highly	accurate	[49-50].	Although	also	linked	to	
individual	differences	in	overall	ability,	interpretation	of	facial	expressions	elicits	
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substantial	inter-observer	agreement	[51-53].	People	even	agree	with	each	other	
when	making	inferences	of	dubious	validity,	such	as	deciding	whether	the	face	of	
someone	they	have	never	seen	before	looks	trustworthy	or	intelligent	[50,	54-56].	
We	need	to	understand	how	we	can	be	good	at	perceiving	some	characteristics	in	
unfamiliar	faces	when	perception	of	unfamiliar	face	identity	can	be	so	problematic.	
	
These	social	inferences	often	meet	our	second	criterion	of	accurate	(or	at	any	rate,	
consensual)	responses,	suggesting	that	the	idea	of	expertise	for	making	them	may	
have	some	merit,	but	with	our	third	criterion	of	automaticity	the	evidence	is	mixed.	
The	problems	with	perception	of	unfamiliar	face	identity	already	discussed	make	
clear	that	this	cannot	be	considered	automatic.	We	are	often	thought	to	have	
become	so	expert	at	perceiving	other	social	characteristics	in	faces	that	they	will	be	
seen	automatically	[57],	and	accurate	or	consensual	judgements	can	be	made	even	
to	relatively	brief	presentations	that	are	in	effect	a	single	glance	[58-59].	For	
example,	first	impressions	of	unfamiliar	faces	based	on	100	ms	presentation	often	
do	not	differ	from	impressions	based	on	unconstrained	presentation	times	[58-59].	
However,	only	a	relatively	limited	form	of	automaticity	is	shown	if	more	stringent	
criteria	are	applied	[16,	60].	For	example,	although	people	are	very	good	at	judging	
the	gender	or	race	of	a	briefly	presented	unfamiliar	face	seen	in	isolation,	their	
accuracy	drops	sharply	when	asked	to	match	pairs	of	faces	on	these	dimensions		and	
they	don't	know	in	advance	whether	they	will	be	asked	to	make	the	match	on	
gender	or	on	race	before	the	trial	begins	[60].	This	drop	in	performance	due	to	
uncertainty	about	what	to	look	for	would	not	be	expected	if	both	gender	and	race	
are	simultaneously	and	effortlessly	perceived.	It	shows	a	limit	to	automaticity	in	
perceiving	more	than	just	the	identity	of	unfamiliar	faces.	
	
In	sum,	on	balance	there	are	grounds	for	claiming	some	form	of	generic	face	
expertise	based	on	our	first	criterion	of	lifetime	experience	of	faces,	but	with	more	
demanding	criteria	these	grounds	are	stronger	for	the	aspects	of	unfamiliar	face	
perception	that	do	not	involve	recognition	of	identity.	
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The	key	role	of	face	familiarity	
	
Findings	of	the	type	summarised	in	Figure	1	and	Box	1	all	involve	unfamiliar	faces.	
For	familiar	faces,	matters	are	completely	different.	Recognising	familiar	faces	is	of	
primary	importance	to	humans,	since	it	forms	a	key	means	of	identifying	a	known	
individual	and	retrieving	appropriate	person-specific	knowledge	to	support	
interaction	based	on	past	experience	[49,	61-64].	Familiar	face	recognition	is	
therefore	embedded	in	a	broader	context	of	retrieval	of	semantic	and	emotional	
information	that	gives	familiar	faces	rich	layers	of	meaning	[64-69].	
	
These	rich	semantic	and	emotional	properties	of	familiar	faces	may	in	themselves	
account	for	some	of	the	differences	between	familiar	and	unfamiliar	faces	[70-71],	
but	there	is	also	a	strong	visual	component.	Although	we	occasionally	make	errors	in	
recognising	familiar	faces	in	everyday	life	[72-73],	recognition	is	usually	fast	and	
accurate	across	huge	variations	in	image	properties,	even	for	degraded	or	briefly	
presented	images	[74-75].	Matching	tasks	with	familiar	faces	seem	to	most	
participants	almost	trivially	easy	[34,	76]	and	familiar	face	recognition	can	meet	
criteria	for	automaticity	[60,	77-78].	We	seem	almost	not	to	notice	the	sheer	scale	of	
variability	in	our	encounters	with	familiar	faces,	and	it	may	be	this	that	misleads	us	
into	expecting	that	we	will	also	be	good	at	recognising	unfamiliar	face	identity	[60].	
Although	there	may	well	be	individual	differences	in	ability	to	recognise	familiar	
faces,	even	those	at	the	bottom	of	the	range	of	ability	in	matching	or	learning	
unfamiliar	faces	(for	example,	in	congenital	prosopagnosia)	may	still	able	to	
recognise	a	number	of	familiar	faces	[79-81].	Moreover,	covert	responses	in	
acquired	prosopagnosia	show	that	some	aspects	of	familiar	face	recognition	can	be	
remarkably	resilient	[65,	82-85].	
	
Understanding	how	view-invariant	recognition	of	familiar	faces	is	achieved,	and	why	
recognition	of	unfamiliar	faces	across	equivalent	image	changes	is	relatively	poor,	
are	therefore	key	theoretical	tasks	[61-62,	75].	Significant	progress	has	been	made	in	
recent	work.	
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-----	BOX	2	ABOUT	HERE,	PLEASE	-----	
	
Box	2	summarises	recent	work	that	shows	that	familiar	face-based	expertise	is	
necessarily	idiosyncratic	to	each	of	the	faces	we	know	well	[86].	By	studying	the	
variability	across	different	images	of	the	same	face	(for	example,	the	statistical	range	
of	images	of	Angela	Merkel	across	different	poses,	lighting	and	facial	expressions)	it	
has	become	clear	that	the	ways	in	which	one	person's	face	varies	are	different	from	
the	ways	in	which	someone	else's	face	will	vary.	To	recognise	Angela	Merkel	from	
any	image	of	her,	then,	our	brains	need	to	have	learnt	how	to	take	into	account	this	
idiosyncratic,	Merkel-specific	variability.	This	means	that	it	is	an	overstatement	to	
claim	people	are	experts	at	recognising	all	faces.	Instead,	it	is	more	appropriate	to	
say	we	are	experts	at	recognising	each	of	the	faces	we	know;	Angela	Merkel,	Tom	
Hanks,	and	so	on.	In	fact	our	ability	to	learn	the	characteristics	of	a	familiar	face	
seems	to	surmount	some	of	the	limitations	that	are	evident	with	unfamiliar	faces,	
such	as	the	other-race	effect;	there	is	no	obvious	decrement	for	recognition	of	
other-race	faces	that	have	become	familiar	[87-88].	
	
Interestingly,	it	turns	out	that	being	expert	at	recognising	even	just	a	handful	of	
familiar	faces	across	highly	variable	images	is	sufficient	to	create	representations	
that	can	reliably	distinguish	social	categories	of	gender	and	race.	A	standard	
computer	engineering	approach	that	can	be	used	to	train	a	computer	model	to	
identify	highly	varied	images	of	different	faces	involves	using	PCA	to	capture	the	
main	dimensions	of	variability	across	the	images	and	LDA	to	then	cluster	together	
images	of	the	same	face	identity;	in	effect	making	these	trained	faces	'familiar'	to	
the	model	[89].	A	trained	model	shows	properties	analogous	to	human	face	
recognition	in	that	it	performs	well	at	recognising	entirely	new	and	highly	variable	
images	of	familiar	(trained)	faces	and	performs	less	well	at	establishing	whether	
different	images	of	unfamiliar	(i.e.	untrained)	faces	are	of	the	same	person.	
Importantly,	the	space	derived	to	cluster	together	disparate	images	of	the	faces	of	
only	a	small	number	of	people	can	also	code	sex	and	race	very	reliably	[89].	
Dimensions	corresponding	to	these	social	categorisations	simply	emerge	as	a	side-
effect	of	solving	the	identification	problem,	despite	the	fact	that	neither	sex	nor	race	
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are	explicitly	coded	in	the	modeling	process.	Remarkably,	these	dimensions	
generalise	to	unfamiliar	faces	too	–	allowing	very	accurate	categorization	of	large	
numbers	of	faces,	never	previously	encountered.		
	
Learning	to	distinguish	the	gender	and	race	of	any	face	can	therefore	be	an	
incidental	consequence	of	expertise	in	recognising	a	small	number	of	familiar	faces.	
It	seems	that	the	cues	needed	to	distinguish	gender	or	race	covary	with	those	
needed	to	recognise	familiar	identities	from	the	very	different	views	we	can	
encounter.	This	is	interesting	because	learning	to	recognise	a	small	number	of	
familiar	individuals	closely	approximates	the	task	facing	human	infants	in	many	
societies	and	any	evolved	neural	substrate	for	face	recognition	ability	will	have	
arisen	within	the	context	of	relatively	small	social	groups	[90].	In	contrast,	a	model	
trained	only	to	classify	gender	offers	no	benefit	to	classifying	identity	[89].	What	
appear	to	be	expert	abilities	in	social	categorisation	may	thus	arise	as	an	incidental	
consequence	of	expert	recognition	of	personally	familiar	faces.	This	shows	how	what	
might	seem	like	complex	patterns	of	expertise	can	emerge	from	simple	processes.	
Here	we	have	a	simple	clustering	model	which	leads	to	some	(familiar)	faces	being	
well-recognised	and	other	(unfamiliar)	faces	being	poorly	recognised	while	all	can	be	
categorised	well	on	the	untrained	dimensions	of	sex	and	race.		
	
Concluding	remarks	
	
Our	message	is	that	face	expertise	takes	a	different	form	than	is	usually	thought.	
While	there	is	undoubtedly	a	sense	in	which	our	huge	experience	of	looking	at	the	
faces	around	us	has	created	a	kind	of	expertise,	this	does	not	take	the	form	of	the	
generic	ability	to	recognise	any	face	identity	that	has	been	so	widely	assumed.	We	
do	not	of	course	seek	to	deny	that	experience	with	faces	may	have	much	to	do	with	
inversion	effects,	holistic	processing	and	the	like.	Neither	do	we	deny	that	there	are	
aspects	of	unfamiliar	face	perception	that	are	accurate,	reliable	or	even	close	to	
automatic	(see	Outstanding	Questions).	However,	recognition	of	unfamiliar	face	
identity	is	not	one	of	these.	Although	clearly	shaped	by	experience	in	some	ways,	as	
shown	for	example	by	other-race	effects,	unfamiliar	face	recognition	remains	
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generally	vulnerable	to	the	impact	of	the	enormous	variability	in	everyday	images	of	
faces.	
	
To	cope	with	the	impact	of	this	everyday	image	variability,	our	face	recognition	
systems	need	to	create	representations	that	can	deal	with	the	different	ways	in	
which	different	known	faces	can	vary.	They	are	therefore	driven	to	create	an	
individually-tailored	type	of	expertise	for	recognising	each	of	the	faces	we	know,	and	
this	explains	why	unfamiliar	face	identity	can	be	problematic.	
	
In	effect,	we	are	familiar	face	experts.	This	insight	reframes	the	expertise	debate	in	a	
way	that	has	important	implications	for	psychological	theory	and	for	a	wide	range	of	
practical	contexts	such	as	passport	control	and	witness	testimony.	
	
Glossary	
	
Acquired	prosopagnosia:	An	almost	complete	inability	to	recognise	familiar	faces	
following	brain	injury	that	cannot	be	explained	by	more	general	visual	or	
intellectual	difficulties.	Usually,	even	the	most	familiar	faces	are	not	
recognised.	Studies	of	acquired	prosopagnosia	following	brain	injury	have	been	
very	influential.	
Congenital	prosopagnosia:	Problems	in	recognising	faces	that	are	present	
throughout	life	and	are	not	linked	to	obvious	neurological	symptoms.	There	
has	been	debate	as	to	whether	congenital	prosopagnosia	represents	a	distinct	
syndrome	or	the	lower	end	of	the	continuum	of	ability	in	the	population.	Most	
studies	define	congenital	prosopagnosia	in	terms	of	poor	ability	on	tests	of	
face	matching	or	unfamiliar	face	learning.	Familiar	face	recognition	may	also	
be	weak,	but	in	nearly	all	cases	some	familiar	faces	can	still	be	recognised.	
Contrast	negation:	Reverses	the	brightness	values	in	an	image,	making	light	regions	
dark	and	dark	regions	light.	This	makes	faces	very	hard	to	recognise.	
Greebles:	A	class	of	artificial	stimuli	intended	to	create	a	category	of	novel	
exemplars	that	share	a	number	of	face-like	properties	[3].	
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Holistic	processing:	Refers	to	the	idea	that	faces	are	processed	as	a	whole,	or	Gestalt	
[2,	91].	
Inversion	effects:	Comparisons	of	ability	to	recognise	stimuli	presented	in	the	
normally	encountered	upright	orientation	or	presented	upside-down.	Face	
recognition	usually	shows	a	substantial	inversion	effect,	with	poorer	
performance	for	inverted	faces.	
LDA:	Linear	Discriminant	Analysis.	This	statistical	technique	fits	exemplars	(here	
faces)	to	a	space	in	which	intra-class	differences	between	images	of	the	same	
face	are	minimised,	while	inter-class	differences	between	images	of	different	
faces	are	maximised,	so	that	images	of	the	same	person's	face	are	clustered	
together.	This	is	a	technique	which	has	been	used	in	many	computer	models	of	
face	recognition.	
PCA:	Principal	Components	Analysis.	A	statistical	technique	that	can	reduce	the	
dimensionality	of	a	large	data	set	to	a	relatively	small	number	of	principal	
components	(PCs)	that	capture	the	main	forms	of	variability	in	the	data.	It	is	
often	applied	to	face	photographs.	
Other-race	effects:	Refers	to	findings	that	most	of	us	are	better	at	learning	and	
recognising	unfamiliar	faces	that	come	from	the	own-race	ethnic	group	with	
which	we	are	most	familiar.	Similarly,	we	also	show	other-race	effects	for	
recognising	facial	expressions.	
Unfamiliar	faces:	Faces	of	people	we	have	not	encountered	before,	or	encountered	
very	little.	Understanding	the	perception	and	recognition	of	unfamiliar	faces	is	
critical	to	everyday	concerns	such	as	eyewitness	testimony	and	passport	
control.	
Within-category	recognition:	The	idea	that	a	type	of	visual	stimulus	has	a	sufficiently	
homogeneous	overall	appearance	that	we	need	to	distinguish	between	items	
within	the	overall	category	to	recognise	individual	exemplars.	Faces,	cars,	and	
flowers	are	commonly	used	examples	where	within-category	recognition	is	
said	to	be	needed.	
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TRENDS	BOX	
Trends	
	
¥ There	is	a	wide	range	of	ability	to	recognise	the	identities	of	unfamiliar	faces	
in	the	population.	
¥ This	variability	is	influenced	by	genes	but	does	not	seem	amenable	to	
training.	Even	having	a	job	that	requires	matching	unfamiliar	faces	does	not	
lead	to	much	improvement.	
¥ Images	of	faces	seen	in	everyday	life	are	highly	variable,	and	much	of	the	
problem	many	of	us	experience	with	unfamiliar	face	identity	comes	from	not	
being	able	to	determine	whether	variability	is	image-related	or	identity-
related.	
¥ Although	failures	of	familiar	face	recognition	do	sometimes	occur,	our	ability	
to	recognise	familiar	faces	is	mostly	excellent,	able	to	cope	with	degraded	
images	and	largely	unaffected	by	image-related	differences.	
¥ Familiar	face	recognition	meets	broad	criteria	for	expertise,	but	recognition	
of	unfamiliar	faces	is	expert	only	in	the	restricted	sense	that	it	is	influenced	
by	experience.	
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OUTSTANDING	QUESTIONS	BOX	
Outstanding	Questions	
	
¥ Why	are	aspects	of	unfamiliar	face	perception	other	than	identity	recognition	
often	accurate	and/or	reliable?	Have	we	acquired	specific	expertise	for	these	
various	tasks,	or	are	some	of	these	abilities	incidental	consequences	of	a	
system	that	is	primarily	oriented	towards	familiar	face	recognition?	
¥ Although	most	of	us	are	not	very	good	at	matching	or	recognising	unfamiliar	
faces,	a	minority	of	individuals	seem	to	be	'super-recognisers'.	Are	these	
super-recognisers	simply	the	top	end	of	the	normal	distribution	of	ability?	
What	exactly	is	it	that	enables	them	to	discount	or	disregard	image	
differences	that	confuse	most	people?	Does	being	a	face	super-recogniser	
entail	any	cost	in	some	other	type	of	perceptual	task?	
¥ If	our	recognition	of	unfamiliar	faces	is	not,	on	average	particularly	good,	why	
is	it	nonetheless	the	case	that	inversion	effects	and	holistic	processing	are	so	
pervasively	found	in	studies	of	unfamiliar	face	recognition?	What	does	
experience	with	faces	contribute	to	this?	
¥ Is	congenital	prosopagnosia	a	qualitatively	distinct	type	of	problem,	or	just	a	
way	of	labelling	the	bottom	end	of	the	normal	distribution	of	ability?	What	
implications	does	very	poor	ability	to	match	and	learn	unfamiliar	faces	have	
for	familiar	face	recognition?	Most	people	described	as	suffering	from	
congenital	prosopagnosia	offer	anecdotal	reports	of	everyday	problems	with	
familiar	faces,	yet	they	can	usually	still	recognise	a	number	of	highly	familiar	
faces.	Is	this	number	of	recognisable	familiar	faces	lower	than	might	
otherwise	be	expected,	is	the	range	of	image	variability	that	can	be	coped	
with	reduced,	or	do	people	with	congenital	prosopagnosia	simply	need	much	
more	exposure	before	a	face	becomes	familiar?	
¥ To	what	extent	do	familiar	and	unfamiliar	face	perception	rely	on	
qualitatively	different	processes?	Are	unfamiliar	faces	just	harder	to	
recognise,	or	are	they	coded	in	a	highly	pictorial	fashion,	as	some	researchers	
have	claimed?	
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Box	1.	Face	matching	in	everyday	life.	
	
The	tasks	shown	in	Figure	1	might	appear	to	be	laboratory	bound,	and	so	the	
question	arises	whether	unfamiliar	face	matching	is	a	problem	in	real	life.		For	
example,	checking	someone’s	photo-ID	involves	interacting	with	a	live,	moving,	
three-dimensional	individual,	not	just	comparing	two	images.	Despite	the	
widespread	requirement	to	use	photos	to	prove	our	identity	(in	passports,	drivers’	
licences	and	other	documents),	it	turns	out	that	the	same	problems	arise	for	photo	
identification	in	everyday	life.	
	
In	a	study	which	copied	the	general	design	of	the	face	matching	task	shown	in	Figure	
1	(a),	the	target	was	sometimes	a	real	person,	to	be	matched	against	photos.		This	
did	not	make	the	problem	easier	–	viewers	made	just	as	many	errors	matching	to	a	
real	person	as	matching	to	a	photo	[38].		
	
In	fact,	this	problem	has	been	shown	to	persist	even	in	highly	natural	settings.	In	a	
study	conducted	in	a	supermarket,	using	specially	created	identity	cards	that	showed	
either	a	valid	photograph	(i.e.,	an	actual	photo	of	the	person)	or	an	invalid	
photograph	(a	photo	of	another	person),	the	supermarket's	own	cashiers	were	told	
to	look	out	for	the	fake	identity	cards	and	told	that	a	bonus	payment	would	be	made	
to	the	cashier	with	the	best	performance	[39].	Yet	the	cashiers	only	challenged	
about	10%	of	people	presenting	a	valid	card	and	accepted	many	of	the	invalid	cards	
if	there	was	some	similarity	in	appearance.	Thus,	even	comparing	a	photo	of	a	face	
to	the	person	standing	in	front	of	you	is	not	as	easy	as	we	usually	take	it	to	be.	
	
It	turns	out	that	unfamiliar	face	matching	can	also	be	a	problem	for	professional	
groups	that	rely	on	this	ability.	For	example,	working	passport	officers	make	errors	
when	asked	to	verify	passport	photos	of	volunteers	during	an	identity	check	[40].	
Just	like	members	of	other	populations,	the	passport	officers	display	large	individual	
differences,	with	some	performing	extremely	well	(almost	perfectly)	but	others	
much	more	poorly.	What	is	interesting	is	that	these	differences	seem	unrelated	to	
experience;	officers	with	as	much	as	20	years	experience	can	still	perform	poorly	
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[40].	Despite	the	fact	that	experienced	officers	have	lengthy	training	histories,	there	
are	just	as	many	high	and	low	scores	from	people	with	all	levels	of	experience.		
	
The	difficulty	of	unfamiliar	face	matching	in	operational	settings	is	beginning	to	be	
addressed	in	some	organisations.	One	approach	is	used	by	the	London	Metropolitan	
Police,	who	select	a	small	number	of	officers	with	high	natural	ability	for	a	'super-
recogniser'	unit,	specializing	in	identification.		This	group	reliably	outperforms	other	
officers	and	the	general	population	on	unfamiliar	face	identification	tasks	[41].		
	
An	alternative	to	recruiting	individuals	with	high	aptitude	is	to	provide	highly	specific	
training.	Professional	forensic	face	identification	examiners,	who	are	trained	in	how	
to	make	detailed	comparisons	across	photographs,	have	also	been	studied	[42].	They	
can	outperform	untrained	participants	and	computer	algorithms,	but	make	use	of	
careful	feature	comparison	strategies	that	require	substantial	time	and	are	little	
affected	by	inversion.	In	other	words,	forensic	examiners	have	been	trained	to	use	
methods	quite	unlike	those	used	in	normal	face	recognition.	While	they	have	been	
shown	to	do	well	on	unfamiliar	face	identification	tasks,	they	remain	far	from	perfect	
and	their	performance	doesn't	reach	levels	which	are	commonplace	in	familiar	face	
recognition.				
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Box	2.	Face	variability	is	idiosyncratic.	
	
Different	images	of	the	same	face	can	vary	due	to	viewpoint,	expression,	lighting	and	
other	properties.	Given	this	substantial	variability,	how	can	we	characterise	the	
invariant	properties	of	each	face	that	make	recognition	possible?	One	approach	is	to	
analyse	how	images	of	the	same	face	vary	by	applying	PCA	to	everyday	photographs	
of	the	same	person	[86];	PCA	is	a	statistical	technique	that	can	reduce	the	
dimensionality	of	photographs	to	a	relatively	small	number	of	principal	components	
(PCs).	This	is	a	widely	used	technique	in	the	computer	science	literature,	but	it	is	
mostly	applied	to	images	of	different	faces.	That	is,	researchers	usually	run	PCA	
across	images	of	many	different	faces	to	establish	dimensions	on	which	faces	differ	
from	one	another.	In	order	to	avoid	coding	superficial	differences,	the	images	used	
in	PCA	are	usually	photographed	under	standard	conditions,	to	eliminate	changes	in	
pose,	expression,	lighting	and	so	on.	
	
However,	instead	of	asking	what	image	properties	can	distinguish	between	all	faces,	
as	in	standard	applications	of	PCA,	we	can	also	ask	what	properties	characterise	the	
highly	variable	images	that	correspond	to	a	specific	face	identity?		By	analyzing	the	
statistics	of	naturally	varying	images,	sampled	from	internet	search	and	deliberately	
not	controlled	for	low	level	characteristics,	it	is	possible	to	describe	the	way	that	
images	of	one	person	vary,	and	to	compare	this	to	the	pattern	for	a	different	person	
[86].		
	
It	turns	out	that	different	faces	have	different	dimensions	of	variation.	Put	simply,	
the	ways	in	which	one	person's	face	varies	from	image	to	image	is	different	from	the	
ways	in	which	someone	else's	face	will	vary.	The	characteristics	that	vary	or	remain	
relatively	consistent	across	images	are	idiosyncratic;	they	differ	between	one	person	
and	another.	
	
The	implication	is	that	we	have	to	learn	separately	the	relatively	variant	and	
invariant	characteristics	of	each	of	the	faces	we	know,	because	the	variability	across	
images	is	to	some	extent	identity-specific	[86].	We	need	to	learn	which	
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characteristics	of	a	particular	face	are	relatively	consistent	and	which	are	variable.	
This	explains	why	unfamiliar	face	matching	is	so	hard.	Confronted	with	two	images	
of	an	unfamiliar	person,	we	often	do	not	know	whether	or	not	the	images	fall	with	
the	range	of	variation	for	that	person,	making	it	hard	to	judge	whether	they	are	the	
same	individual.	For	familiar	people,	we	have	learned	how	their	faces	can	change,	
making	a	matching	decision	much	easier.			
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FIGURE	
	
Figure	1:	Examples	of	how	tricky	it	can	be	to	recognise	the	identities	of	unfamiliar	
faces,	showing	that	this	is	in	large	part	a	perceptual	problem.	
Figure	1	(a):	Is	the	top	person	present	in	the	lower	array,	or	are	they	missing?	
Average	error	rates	are	substantial,	yet	there	is	no	event-memory	component	to	the	
task	[33].	
Figure	1	(b):	Can	you	sort	the	40	images	into	the	different	face	identities?	If	the	faces	
are	unfamiliar,	most	people	overestimate	the	number	of	identities	present	[34].	
Figure	1	(c).	Two	example	pairs	of	images	from	the	Glasgow	Face	Matching	Test	[35].	
This	test	simply	asks	people	to	decide	whether	or	not	two	simultaneously	presented	
images	show	the	same	person.	The	top	row	shows	two	images	of	different	identities,	
while	the	bottom	row	illustrates	a	‘same	identity’	image	pair.	Note	that	all	faces	in	
the	GFMT	are	unfamiliar	and	that	all	test	items	involve	pairs	of	photographs	with	
substantial	superficial	differences.		
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